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Is YOUR ANTHROPOLOGY? WHAT ARE YOUR ETHICS?
Robert H. Holden

e tend to think of the great ridge
that rose up inside the historical
profession some three decades
ago, splitting historians into two camps, as
some kind of epistemological event. Ancient
disagreements about the nature (and existence) of truth suddenly became more
extreme and divisive. Now, the biggest flags
wave over the "relativists" on one side, and
the ''truth seekers" on the other. Smaller banners ("moderate historicists," "constructivists," "positivists," etc.) fly here and there
along the slopes of lower-lying ranges on
each side of the great divide, itself breached
by passes and tunnels excavated by historians
loathe to commit themselves to either camp.
But there is another way of looking at
what divides historians. Who we think we are
affects what we think we can know: "We are
encouraged these days," Thomas Nagel has
pointed out, "to think of ourselves as contingent organisms arbitrarily thrown up by evolution. There is no reason in advance to
expect a finite creature like that to be able to
do more than accumulate information at the
perceptual and conceptual level it occupies
by nature."'
I argue (from the standpoint of philosophical realism) that disagreements rooted in different epistemological assumptions might
also be understood as rival ways of answering
the question, "Who is the human person?" I
find it curious that even as we cram our journals with articles about "identity," we don't
seem to acknowledge the deeper differences
over how we define the most fundamental of
all identities. I argue, furthermore, that these
differences in philosophical anthropology
have ethical consequences for the writing of
history: different anthropologies lead to fundamentally different ethics of knowledge.
And those ethics come into play whenever
historians choose topics to investigate, apply
methods of research, and propose interpretations.
First, to the anthropological question. Of
all the branches of philosophy, Henri-lrenee
Marrou argued, historical knowledge depends
most on that dealing with anthropology. He
likened the historian's chosen philosophy of
man to an axle or a nervous system, so that
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what we write as historians "stands or falls"
with our philosophical anthropology, our idea
of the human person.2 Most historians agree
that we need to take into account both the
spontaneity and creativity of the individual
person as well as the limits and conditions
that restrict individual freedom. So, just who
is this free being who makes history, including the ideologies and institutions that condition his or her very freedom?
One reason that the question has excited so
little interest among historians may be the
extreme historicism that prevails today. Of
what use is a theory of the person when one
assumes that all of man's works and his very
identity are nothing but expressions of history itself, and therefore merely relative to
some time and place?3 What passed for philosophical anthropology in the 20th century
ended up being the reductio ad absurdum of
Rousseau's idea of man as malleable, bereft
of any fixed nature. "Man is what has happened to him, what he has done," said Jose
Ortega y Gasset, theorist of historicism. "This
is why it makes no sense to put limits on what
man is capable of being." Man has no nature,
the Spanish philosopher declared; he only has
a history.4
It is, I submit, this particularly miserable
idea of the human person-namely, the belief
that our nature is nothing but our historicity-that ultimately accounts for the vague
sensation among some of us that in reading a
good deal of history today we are drinking
from a poisoned well. What's wrong with the
water is not so much the relativistic assumptions about knowledge and truth but its
Rousseauian naturalism. The water is not
potable because it is not compatible with
whom we know ourselves to be.
Why should historians be guided by a
belief in man's essential nature? Because
without it, anything man does, as well as anything he has done, is as valuable or as valueless as anything else. History would be meaningless. Sitting down to write a constitution,
hauling coal out of the ground, or nursing a
baby would be substantially equivalent to,
say, clobbering your brother to death with a
blunt instrument. Or, as one philosopher commented at a public forum a couple of weeks

after September 11, 2001, since there was no
such thing as evil, the Twin Towers catastrophe really had no special meaning at all. It
was, he declared, "just another plane crash."
Unlike most historians, Thomas Klubock
has helpfully called specific attention to his
belief in Rousseauian naturalism. The need
for more studies of "homosocial networks
and ties" is obstructed by "an implicit
assumption of naturalized heterosexuality, of
an inevitable male-female binary opposition. "5 Similarly, Steven C. Topik proposed a
vast research program to answer the question,
"does coffee production impose certain structures and world views?" His hypothesis that a
wide range of beliefs, actions, and attitudes
might be determined by the simple fact ofliving in a coffee-growing region of the world
was grounded in what he approvingly called
a "central observation" of Karl Marx: that
man only "'begins to distinguish himself
from the animal the moment he begins to produce his means of subsistence, a step required
by his physical organization . . . . What they
[individuals] are, therefore, coincides with
what they produce and how they produce.
The nature of individuals thus depends on the
material conditions which determine their
production. "' 6 It is hard to believe that Topik
really thinks that what he himself is "coincides" with the books and articles that he has
written and how he has written them, or that
he thinks that, in thus producing his own
"means of subsistence," he unveils the only
difference between Steve Topik and, say, a
grasshopper or a grizzly bear.
The anthropologist Sidney Mintz's Worker
in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History, first
published in 1960, is still in print and remains
a model for a new kind of history, according
to the historian Florencia Mallon. The book is
the product of hundreds of hours of conversations between Mintz and Eustaquio (Taso)
Zayas Alvarado, a Puerto Rican cane cutter
and father of ten children. Evidently, Taso
attracted Mintz's interest because of his participation in union and left-wing political
causes and his intelligence and above-average leadership abilities. But not long after
Mintz undertook the interviews, Taso converted from a non-practicing Catholic to the
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Pentecostal Church of God, withdrawing
from union and political causes. Astounded
and disappointed, Mintz realized that his proletarian hero had feet of clay.
In the course of thirteen pages in the last
part of the book, Mintz desperately sorts
through a series of social, economic, ideological, and psychological explanations for
Taso's conversion before settling on the possibility that "conversion to a revivalist sect
may be viewed as a way of increasing one's
social and economic mobility." Or maybe
Taso was just overcome by guilt feelings of
some kind. Mintz invited the reader to share
his own chilling conclusion: to see in Taso's
life "the waste I think I see: the waste of a
mind that stands above the others." 7 Taso, the
reader is left to infer, is nothing more than an
animal who reasons, and whether he reasons
well or badly, according to Mintz's precepts,
is the only thing that interests the researcher.
There is no place here for a spiritual dimension to which politics and class struggle
might rightly be subordinated.
Historians may have rejected the existence
of a human nature. But they have, strangely
enough, embraced with enthusiasm Marx's
Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change
it." 8 The application of Marx's thesis depends
on the absence of any coherent philosophical
anthropology, which would pose an intolerable restriction on the freedom of historians to
advance their favorite political projects.
But what accounts for this compulsion to
see and judge everything in terms of some
emancipatory political project? "In the
absence of religious belief," Anthony Daniels
suggests, the compulsion "answers man's
need for a purpose that transcends the humdrum tasks and flux of day-to-day existence
in a settled democratic society. In doing so, it
reassures the individual of his personal significance even as he frets about his insignificance." As the border between personal life
and the political realm breaks down, other
limits seem to melt away. The compulsion
intensifies, "even as some of its ostensible
ends are met." 9 Perhaps this is what accounts
for the rapture with which so many historians
and other scholars gaze upon the life of the
late Michel Foucault. Here was a brave intellectual, they say, who tried to live as if he didn't really believe there was any moral difference between the assassin and the victim. To
live in that way no doubt does takes a certain
amount of courage. Foucault lived and died

according to the Eleventh · Thesis on
Feuerbach even as he declared the death of
the very idea of a philosophical anthropology.
"To die for the love of boys," Foucault sighed
the year before his death of AIDS in 1984.
"What could be more beautiful?" 10 But what
about "the boys?" They were sheer historicity, which is to say, nothing.
The problem is an ethical one, but it is first
of all anthropological. To speak of "moral
rules and principles," according to the
philosopher John Rist, ''without reference to
the nature of man and of each man risks being
if not literal nonsense, at least abstract, useless, even dangerous fantasy-such as that of
abstract liberalism." Every ethical enunciation invariably assumes some "theory about
the kind of beings who can contemplate,"
whatever ethical goal is proposed. This
means that every ethical theory is also a natural law theory, and that the best moral theories will therefore be linked to some "truer,
more defensible accounts of human nature." 11
I would argue, therefore, that the great
ridge that divides historians is best conceived
as one that separates us according to radically different theories of the person. The dominant one reduces man to a material expression of the natural world, not essentially different from an animal. A much longer and
more humane tradition began with Aristotle,
flourished under the influence of St.
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and
ripened in the 20th century with the development of the philosophy of personalism. 12 This
tradition yields accounts of the past shaped
by the conviction that the human person, as
an embodied spirit created to fulfill a specific
vocation in life, is more than a self-made
"identity" or "producer," that there are
aspects of human nature that are unchangeable, and that to flout them is to invite disaster. Historians who approach the past with
these premises may well tackle the same topics as their colleagues on the other side of the
ridge, but they pose different kinds of questions and offer interpretations of another
order.
Of course, historians rarely announce their
philosophical anthropologies. Detecting them
may be difficult or impossible. But that doesn't mean they are irrelevant. Without referring directly to either anthropology or personalism, the historian Fran~ois Xavier Guerra
showed just how powerfully influential a personalist-oriented philosophy can be in the
writing of history. Arguing against the tendency of so many historians to attribute pri-

mary causal authority to abstract economic,
social, demographic, and mental "structures"
and "forces," Guerra asked: "What are these
structures but a formalization of relations
between men and nature, or between men and
other men?" The ultimate subject of every
historical inquiry is the human person, acting
as an individual or as a member of a group.
To assume, as we often do, that individual
persons merely represent or incarnate some
nation, people, or social group ("the peasantry," "the landless," etc.) is a grave methodological error.13
One of the most striking consequence of
these distinctive anthropologies lies in their
corresponding ethics of knowledge. The
Rousseauian anthropology yields a utilitarian
ethics. The Aristotelian anthropology's
assumption of an essential human nature
links it naturally with a virtue-based ethics;
having certain virtues makes possible the
attainment of the telos imposed by human
nature. In the first paragraph of his classic
introduction to historiography, Marrou asked,
"What is the correct behavior of reason in the
field of history?" What were "the virtues of
the historian"? Here, ethics is not about codes
of professional conduct or rules against plagiarism. There is a deeper ethic at play-an
ethics of knowledge or a normative epistemology-that governs the selection of topics,
the purpose of research, the choice of
hypotheses and interpretations.
Essays devoted to ethical self-reflection of
a rather different order have multiplied in the
academy during the last decade or so. "The
mission of the African-American scholar,"
Peter J. Paris of Princeton University
declared in his 1995 inaugural address as
president of the American Academy of
Religion, "is a moral mission, because its
final aim is the realization of racial justice in
the nation's thought and practice." The main
purpose of feminist research, according to
Gesa E. Kirsch, is to "empower [women] to
change the conditions of their lives." To
Clifford Christians, a "basic norm" of what
has come to be called "interpretive research"
is that of "enabling the humane transformation of the multiple spheres of community
life-religion, politics, ethnicity, gender, and
so forth." 14 For the Yale historian Emilia
Viotti da Costa, historians ought to be opening up "new roads to a more open and truly
democratic world, where all people of different genders, classes, ethnicities, religions,
and nationalities will come together to participate equally in the wealth of the world."ts
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These pronouncements represent utilitarian ethics at its crudest. The past is a databank
to be pillaged for the advancement of one or
another social change project. The underlying
anthropology seems to be that of the naturalist conception of the human person as nothing
more than a complex animal thrown up by
evolution. On this view, there can be no logical rejoinder to the manipulation or distortion
of the past in the service of ideology. None of
the scholars just quoted hints at a theory of
the person. To have done so might have sunk
them in a morass of contradiction-between
their utopian goals and reality, between the
evident necessity to know the truth even
when the truth fails to point to utopia. Nor do
any of them propose any objective grounding
for the moral purposes that they think should
guide research. Precisely why should I orient
my work toward the "humane transformation
of the multiple spheres," etc.?
On the other hand, since the 1980s epistemologists and ethicists have been investigating the special way in which virtue ethics
applies to the production of knowledge. "The
fundamental questions of epistemology,"
wrote Linda Zagzebski, "are varieties of the
question 'How ought we to go about finding
out the truth?' or 'What counts as a good
belief?' or 'What gives us understanding?"'
The goodness of knowledge, she argued, "is
partially constituted by the motive to get it."
What Aristotelians and Thomists call "the
intellectual virtues" are nothing but forms of
moral virtues, which is why "epistemic evaluation is a form of moral evaluation." 16
Similarly, Gilbert Meilaender, citing
Augustine, Aquinas, and John Henry
Newman, argued that knowledge which is not
acquired in accord with what we know to be
good is illicit. Knowledge is not something
that one picks up in a supposedly autonomous
intellectual sphere; its acquisition depends on
prior knowledge of what is good and on the
proper motivation.17
Perhaps this is what Octavio Paz had in
mind when, four years before his death in
1998, he wrote, "The exercise of criticism
demands intelligence and likewise character,
moral rigor." Denouncing "evil," "lies," "the
nihilism of relativity," and the "ideological
intoxication" of so many Latin American
intellectuals, Paz exalted the virtues and even
proposed a recovery of religious tradition.18
Though Paz is not known to have been a
believer, his words make him an intellectual
companion of the great French Thomist, A. D Sertillanges, who long ago reminded

would-be scholars that "the purity of thought
presupposes purity of the soul." 19
Perhaps it is time for historians to begin
asking each other, and their students, "What's
your anthropology? What's your ethics?"
Robert H. Holden is associate professor
of Latin American history at Old
Dominion University. His most recent
book is Armies Without Nations: Public
Violence and State Formation in Central
America, 1821-1961 (Oxford University
Press, 2004).
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